Working paper

A Model Of Debates: Moderation Vs Free Speech

Year:

2022

Published in:

SSRN
Communication
debate
poll
experts
Bayesian persuasion
information design
information monopoly
informational framing
spamming

This paper provides a framework to study communication conflicts, such as political debates, using a novel model of competition in Bayesian persuasion. Debating parties can "frame" their arguments for maximal impact. They also can "spam" the discussion to distract the audience from the opponent's arguments. We find that spamming is more detrimental to truth discovery than framing. When parties are allowed to speak freely, spamming can kill truth discovery and make communication uninformative. By contrast, framing is disciplined by competition. If the conflict between parties is strong and the number of arguments is restricted, the parties reveal the truth.

Other publications by

57 publications found

2019
Book

Recent Developments In Data Science And Intelligent Analysis Of Information

Publisher: Springer Cham

Authors: Tymofiy Mylovanov, Oleg Chertov, Yuriy Kondratenko, Janusz Kacprzyk, Vladik Kreinovich, Vadim Stefanuk

2013
Working paper

Optimality Of Non‑Competitive Allocation Rules

Publisher: CiteSeerX

Authors: Tymofiy Mylovanov, Andriy Zapechelnyuk

2016
Report

From Hybrid Peace To Human Security: Rethinking Eu Strategy Toward Conflict

Publisher: London School of Economics and Political Science

Authors: Tymofiy Mylovanov, Ruben Andersson, Valerie Arnould, Vesna Bojicic-Dzelilovic, Emmanuel Darmois , Alex de Waal, Francesco Giumelli , Mustafa Haid, Rachel Ibreck, Mary Kaldor, Nataša Kandić, Anna Maria Kellner, Denisa Kostovicova, Roger Mac Ginty, Mary Martin, Elisa Randazzo, Iavor Rangelov, Oliver Richmond, Geneviève Schméder, Sabine Selchow, Javier Solana, Marika Theros, Mattia Toaldo, Rim Turkmani, Koen Vlassenroot

2013
Journal article

Decision Rules Revealing Commonly Known Events

Publisher: Economics Letters

Authors: Tymofiy Mylovanov, Andriy Zapechelnyuk

2006
Working paper

A Characterization Of The Conditions For Optimal Auction With Resale

Publisher: University of Mannheim

Authors: Tymofiy Mylovanov, Thomas Tröger

2022
Book

Macroeconomic Policies For Wartime Ukraine

Publisher: CEPR Press

Authors: Tymofiy Mylovanov, Torbjörn Becker, Barry J. Eichengreen, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Sergei Guriev, Simon Johnson, Maurice Obstfeld, Kenneth Rogoff, Beatrice Weder di Mauro

2018
Book Chapter

Review Of The EU Policy For Ukraine

Publisher: Routledge

Authors: Tymofiy Mylovanov, Yuri M. Zhukov, Yuriy Gorodnichenko

2004
Working paper

Failure To Delegate And Loss Of Control

Publisher: Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems

Authors: Tymofiy Mylovanov

2022
Report

A Blueprint For The Reconstruction Of Ukraine

Publisher: CEPR Press

Authors: Tymofiy Mylovanov, Torbjörn Becker, Barry J. Eichengreen, Yuriy Gorodnichenko, Sergei Guriev, Simon Johnson, Kenneth Rogoff, Beatrice Weder di Mauro

2005
Working paper

A Note On Zheng`S Conditions For Implementing An Optimal Auction With Resale

Publisher: University of Bonn

Authors: Tymofiy Mylovanov, Thomas Tröger