Optimal Allocation With Ex Post Verification And Limited Penalties
Year:
2017Published in:
American Economic ReviewSeveral agents with privately known social values compete for a prize. The prize is allocated based on the claims of the agents, and the winner is subject to a limited penalty if he makes a false claim. If the number of agents is large, the optimal mechanism places all agents above a threshold onto a shortlist along with a fraction of agents below the threshold, and then allocates the prize to a random agent on the shortlist. When the number of agents is small, the optimal mechanism allocates the prize to the agent who makes the highest claim, but restricts the range of claims above and below.
Related by author
57 publications found
A Way Forward For Ukraine
Publisher: International Herald Tribune
Authors: Tymofiy Mylovanov, Scott Gehlbach, Roger Myerson
Mechanism Design With Ex‑Post Verification And No Transfers
Publisher: Bocconi University
Authors: Tymofiy Mylovanov, Andriy Zapechelnyuk
Optimal Auction With Resale—A Characterization Of The Conditions
Publisher: Economic Theory
Authors: Tymofiy Mylovanov, Thomas Tröger
Review Of The EU Policy For Ukraine
Publisher: Routledge
Authors: Tymofiy Mylovanov, Yuri M. Zhukov, Yuriy Gorodnichenko
Informed‑Principal Problems In Environments With Generalized Private Values
Publisher: Theoretical Economics
Authors: Tymofiy Mylovanov, Thomas Tröger
Little White Lies–The Value Of Inconsequential Chatter
Publisher: Research Gate
Authors: Tymofiy Mylovanov, Nicolas Klein
Government By Code? Blockchain Applications To Public Sector Governance
Publisher: Frontiers
Authors: Tymofiy Mylovanov, Pedro Bustamante, Meina Cai, Marcela Gomez, Colin Harris, Prashant Krishnamurthy, Wilson Law, Michael J Madison, Ilia Murtazashvili, Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili, Nataliia Shapoval, Annette Vee, Martin Weiss
How To Identify Foreign Business In Russia And What Are The Key Issues Of Creating And Keeping A Full List Of The Largest Foreign Companies In Russia
Publisher: SSRN
Authors: Tymofiy Mylovanov, Nataliia Shapoval, Andrii Onopriienko, Oleksii Hrybanovskyi
Veto‑Based Delegation
Publisher: Journal of Economic Theory
Authors: Tymofiy Mylovanov
First‑Mover Disadvantage
Publisher: University of Mannheim
Authors: Tymofiy Mylovanov