Precis Of Knowledge And Practical Interests
Year:
2007Published in:
Philosophy and Phenomenological ResearchOur intuitions about whether someone knows that p vary even fixing the intuitively epistemic features of that person's situation. Sometimes they vary with features of our own situation, and sometimes they vary with features of the putative knower's situation. If the putative knower is in a risky situation and her belief that p is pivotal in achieving a positive outcome of one of the actions available to her, or avoiding a negative one, we often feel she must be in a particularly good epistemic position to know that p. If however she is not in a risky situation, we tend to be considerably more permissive in our attributions of knowledge. Our intuitions about when someone knows that p and when she doesn't also fluctuate with what is salient, either to the putative knower or ourselves. If someone claims to know where their car is, and I raise the possibility that it has been stolen, she may retract her claim to know.
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